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ABSTRACT—Concentration of ownership over land or other resources is
both a sign and a cause of inequality. Concentration of ownership makes
access to such resources difficult for those less powerful, and it can have
negative effects on local communities that benefit from a more distributed
ownership pattern. Such concentration goes against the antimonopoly
principles behind the homesteading land policies and the legal regimes that
regulate many natural resources. This Essay suggests that where
concentration is a concern, one might draw lessons for reform by looking to
the field of natural resources law, which employs a range of deconcentration
mechanisms affecting fisheries, mineral extraction, farmland, and the like
that have proven a considerable success. These deconcentration mechanisms
have taken mostly two forms: restrictions on how much one rights holder can
hold and restrictions on who can hold rights. These deconcentrating
measures are more likely to be adopted in resources with a defined, relatively
small market, with homogeneous uses and users, and where community
externalities from concentration are assessable.
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INTRODUCTION
Oracle CEO Larry Ellison evidently enjoyed a vacation to the Hawaiian
Island of Lanai to such an extent that it prompted him to acquire title to most
of the island. For the bargain price of $300 million, Ellison now held the
keys to convert the Lanai landscape—on which 3,200 people lived yearround—into his personal version of a health and sustainability utopia.1
Ellison’s holding is but one illustration of the extensive concentration
of ownership that plagues our real property regime nationwide. The 100
largest private landowners in the United States own an area equivalent to
New England sans Vermont.2 Bill and Melinda Gates entered this list in
2020, making it to the forty-ninth position with their total 242,000 acres.3
They entered by buying 14,500 acres in east Washington’s fertile Columbia
River Basin called 100 Circles.4 The tab: $12,000 per acre.5 The seller was
1
Avery Hartmans, Oracle Billionaire Larry Ellison Now Lives on Lana’i, the Hawaiian Island He
Mostly Owns. Here’s How He’s Working to Turn the Island into a Wellness Utopia and ‘100% Green
Community.,’ INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2021, 10:37 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/oracle-larry-ellisonlanai-hawaii-plans-sustainability-tourism-2020-12 [https://perma.cc/LR29-DXNB]; Jon Moallen, Larry
Ellison
Bought
an
Island
in
Hawaii.
Now
What?,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Sept.
23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/magazine/larry-ellison-island-hawaii.html [https://
perma.cc/CQK4-J6FN]. The population of the island has dropped since the 2020 census. See Lanai City,
Hawaii Population 2022, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/lanaicity-hi-population [https://perma.cc/22HP-LGJG].
2
The Biggest U.S. Landowners Own Nearly as Many Acres as New England States, FERN (Jan. 1,
2018),
https://thefern.org/ag_insider/biggest-u-s-landowners-nearly-many-acres-new-england-states/
[https://perma.cc/FA8C-FXSA]; Jeff Etheredge, Lisa Martin, & Katy Richardson, The Land Report 100,
LAND REP., Winter 2020, at 123, https://landreport.com/americas-100-largest-landowners/
[https://perma.cc/3PNJ-B9S5].
3
Etheredge et al., supra note 2, at 148.
4
Eric O’Keefe, Bill Gates Is About to Change the Way America Farms, LAND REP., Winter 2020, at
54, 56, https://editions.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?i=688913 [https://perma.cc/6RS2-EGY3].
5
Id.
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John Hancock Life Insurance Co. a multi-billion dollar asset management
company with key holdings in major markets in the United States, Canada,
and Australia.6 In 2021, another billionaire, the richest person on Earth, Jeff
Bezos, also made it to the list in the twenty-fourth position by amassing
420,000 acres.7 The top ten of this list of 100 largest landowners has not
changed much for over a decade.8 The Emmerson family, now number one,
owns almost 2.5 million acres and have been involved in single acquisitions
of up to half a million acres, but several other landowners have landholdings
of over two million acres.9
Only sovereign wealth funds, institutional investors, and extremely
powerful individuals can cut those checks. This concentration of ownership
is reminiscent of feudal times, and it certainly illustrates the disparities in
wealth and income present today in the United States.10 The control by one
or few powerful actors makes us uncomfortable and rightly so. Ownership
concentration makes it harder for others to access landownership. In
addition, it is harder for state and local governments to regulate this private
power, which often dwarfs theirs. The State of Colorado is currently
struggling with its response to large out-of-state financial companies
investing in water rights and becoming the main water rights holder in many
areas.11 Wall Street is investing in water directly or investing in farms with
water rights.12 Furthermore, landownership concentration, particularly if
coupled with an absentee landowner, has effects beyond the parties to the

6

Id. at 57.
Cary Estes, Jeff Etheridge, & Lisa Martin, The Land Report 100, LAND REP., Winter 2021, at 110,
142, https://editions.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?m=61105&i=733821&p=112&ver=html5
[https://perma.cc/3YAU-6NZX].
8
Compare The Land Report 100, LAND REP., Fall 2012, at 62, 64–68,
https://editions.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?m=61105&i=612201&p=66&ver=html5 [https://
perma.cc/9BJP-3J8G], with Estes et al., supra note 7, at 112–20 (noting that nine of the ten families
remained the same in these two lists).
9
Estes et al., supra note 7, at 112–24 (noting that the list includes John Malone, the Reed Family,
and Ted Turner).
10
See Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287,
1309–10 (2014).
11
Ben Ryder Howe, Wall Street Eyes Billions in the Colorado’s Water, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/03/business/colorado-river-water-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/BS74-962R].
12
This is actually the approach that Michael Burry, masterfully depicted in The Big Short, has taken.
He is buying fertile farmland. Dillon Jacobs, How to Invest in Water Like Dr. Michael Burry from the Big
Short, FINMASTERS (Mar. 11, 2022), https://finmasters.com/michael-burry-invest-in-water/
[https://perma.cc/9JWQ-Z3LJ]. While we do not know the motives of the Gateses, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text, their aim could be similar.
7
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transaction: local communities may lose control over their present and
their future.13
There have been few robust moves in the property system to directly
counter the issue of land concentration. There are but a few select regulatory
examples to the contrary, such as the reform at issue in the famous takings
case of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff three decades prior to Ellison’s
acquisition.14 This Essay suggests that where concentration is a concern, one
might draw lessons for law reform by looking to the field of natural resources
law, which employs a range of deconcentration mechanisms affecting
fisheries, mineral extraction, farmland, and the like that have proven a
considerable success. The existence of these measures suggests strong
antimonopoly and distributive justice principles underlying our natural
resources regulations.15 These deconcentration mechanisms have taken
mostly two forms: restrictions on how much one rights holder can hold and
restrictions on who can hold rights. For example, in the Alaskan fisheries’
quota system, there are limits both on the total amount of catch someone can
hold and on the size of business that can hold them.16
Given the increasing scarcity of some of our natural resources due to
climate change and the also growing concentration of wealth, considering
measures like the definition of tiered property rights in the Alaskan fisheries’
quota system or the limits on mineral leases on public lands is growing
increasingly relevant. But such transplants are not always straightforward.17
In this regard, when borrowing these deconcentration measures, there are
three related factors that regulators need to consider: the scope of the market,
the homogeneity of resource users and their kinds of uses, and the
pervasiveness of community externalities. Preexisting rights will also
influence the decision of which measures to adopt.
13

See infra Section II.E for a description of deep-pocket investment in different states.
467 U.S. 229 (1984). With the Land Reform Act, Hawaii aimed to solve concentration of
ownership by exercising eminent domain and allowing those who were renting from some of the large
landowners to acquire the property with financial help from the government. The mechanism worked as
follows: any lessee living on a single-family residential lot of two acres or less could apply to the state
for purchase of their lot if it was part of a development tract of at least five acres and if the lessee did not
own residential property nearby. If twenty-five lessees or half the lots in a tract (whichever was less) filed
similar applications, the state would determine if the sale satisfied a public purpose. If that was the case,
the state would force the sale of the land or reach a voluntary agreement and resell it to the tenants. See
id. at 233–34; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 516-1, 516-22.
15
Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in American Public Land Law, 28 GEO. ENV’T
L. REV. 155, 157 (2016); David Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the
Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 7 (2005).
16
Infra Section II.C.
17
See generally Vanessa Casado Pérez & Yael Lifshitz, Natural Transplants, 97 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933
(2022) (analyzing the reasons for and challenges of transplanting legal doctrines across subject areas,
particularly as they relate to natural resources law).
14
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Part I describes the potential costs arising from concentration of control
over a resource. Part II reviews different natural resource regimes—from
land to water—where ownership has been limited, the mechanisms
employed to set those limits, and the reasons for those limits. Section II.A,
Homesteading, describes the antimonopoly principles that are deeply
embedded in our public land policies. Section II.B, Minerals on Federal
Lands, shows how limits on concentration ensure governments are not
dwarfed by those controlling natural resources. Section II.C, Fisheries,
illustrates not only distributive aims in the design of property rights, but
concerns beyond rights holders. In fisheries, distributive policies protect both
small businesses and the communities that depend on them. In Section II.D,
an unsuccessful example is covered: Farmland. Farmland policies,
particularly in Iowa, have been described as anti-corporate because they limit
the ownership of land to family corporations. The limits in Iowa have not
been successful in preventing de facto concentration. Finally, Section II.E,
Water Rights, captures a new wave of concentration: Wall Street firms
investing in resources made scarcer by climate change. Part III analyzes
which factors make deconcentrating reforms like those explored in
Part II likely.
I.

THE RISKS OF CONCENTRATION

Concentration of ownership of a resource can have negative
consequences when such concentration translates, as it often does, into
power and control imbalances. This Part starts by reviewing the moral
grounds of why concentration is wrong, mostly based on the ideas of
distributive justice and social participation. The example of Hawaii’s land
reform illustrates the above points. Second, building on the distributive
justice component, this Part then expands on the inequality effects of
concentration by reviewing how the tragedy of the groundwater commons in
rural Arizona disproportionately affected those with fewer resources. Third,
this Part will cover the risks of concentration beyond users themselves,
looking at effects on communities, the environment, and local governments
through the examples of the 2016 Scottish land reform and Colorado’s path
to curb water speculation.
Ethically, accumulating more than you need or having too much is
suspect.18 John Locke maintained that an individual could own as much
property as “any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils,
so much he may by his Labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is

18
Patricia Farnese, An Ethic of Enough: Ownership as an Ethical Choice, 4 J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 81,
85 (2019). This has dimensions both between individuals and between people and the environment.
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more than his share, and belongs to others.”19 Similarly, when the Supreme
Court of Illinois in 1898 discussed the ownership of the town of Pullman by
Pullman’s Palace-Car Company, the court stated that such concentration was
“incompatible with the theory and spirit of our institutions” and interpreted
state law as requiring the company to sell part of the land.20
One of the leading progressive property scholars in the country,
Professor Joseph Singer of Harvard Law School, reviewing Pullman’s
Palace-Car Co. and other cases, discusses how while large owners help
minimize information costs in the market, they create uncertainty and make
access difficult for anyone else who wants to buy a piece of land.21 This
creates inequality, which harms the economy and leaves more people with
unsatisfied preferences, eroding our ideal of democracy and moving us
closer to a feudal system in which we are divided between owners
and tenants.22
Concentration of ownership often goes hand in hand with absentee
ownership.23 This often implies that those who do not own property will be
tenants. Tenancy was not the preference in the United States or in modern
democracies.24 Tenancy was conceived at best as a step towards ownership.
Becoming an owner, rightly or not, was the goal. Ownership creates security,
wealth, and particularly for the purposes of this Essay, stewardship. Tenants
have incentives to think short-term and, thus, they often choose not to invest
in the land or other resources sustainably.
The ownership and operation of farmland provides a useful example of
the intersection of landownership and sustainability. Farmland does not need
to be operated by the owner, but land tenure is key for a sustainable system.
As former farmer Neil Hamilton put it: “Land ownership provides the
stability, the autonomy, the opportunity for long-term planning and
investment, and the wealth creation potential that is central to our agricultural

19

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 31 (C.B. McPherson ed., 1980) (1690).
People ex. rel. Moloney v. Pullman’s Palace-Car Co., 51 N.E. 664, 674 (Ill. 1898).
21
Singer, supra note 10, at 1310.
22
Id. at 1312.
23
JAYNE GLASS, ROB MCMORRAN & STEVEN THOMSON, THE EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH
CONCENTRATED AND LARGE-SCALE LAND OWNERSHIP IN SCOTLAND § 2.4.3, at 16 (2019),
https://www.landcommission.gov.scot/downloads/5dd7d807b8768_Research-Review-Concentratedownership-final-20190320.pdf [https://perma.cc/65PN-HFQ5] (correlating the increasing number of
large, privately owned sporting estates with nonresident ownership in Scotland).
24
Hous. Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Castle, 898 P.2d 576, 593–94 (Haw. 1995) (“Owning property,
especially real property on which one lives, together with all of its legal and equitable rights, is an
American dream.”) (quoting S. 4-19, at 799–802 (Haw. 1967)); Peter Dreier, The Status of Tenants in the
United States, 30 SOC. PROBS. 179, 179 (1982).
20
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history. Farmers who own their land have more security and autonomy.”25
But while providing for broad landownership was a goal of the early U.S.
republic, widespread distribution of land was also key to advancing
democracy and equality of political power.26 In fact, United States public
land and natural resource policies have always been based on an
antimonopoly principle, favoring settlers over speculators.27
The Hawaiian Land Reform Act, which was deemed constitutional in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,28 perfectly captures this preference for
ownership versus tenancy and the social goals that a less concentrated system
should achieve. Decades before Larry Ellison purchased the island of Lanai,
the Hawaiian legislature decided to put an end to the quasi-feudal land
concentration existing in Hawaii, where many of those using the land were
tenants at best. The Land Reform Act of 1967 allowed the Hawaiian
government to condemn large landholdings to then redistribute them to those
occupying the land in fee simple.29 This would allow the land to be
transferred without the tax consequences of private land sales.30
As the initial version of the Act put it, the goal of the statute was “the
promotion of the public welfare and the securing of liberty as enunciated in
the Constitution of the United States through the attainment of fee simple
ownership of residential lots by the greatest number of people.”31 The
condemnation was at the request of tenants who had to put forward the funds
for the condemnation and had a bona fide intent to live in the development
tract or in Hawaii,32 clearly prioritizing residential uses and nonabsentee
owners. Furthermore, each person could only acquire one tract.33
The legislature expected that the Act would bring “happiness,” “general
welfare,” full enjoyment, and “security” to the lessees,34 compared to

25

Sally Worley, Who Owns the Farmland?, PRAC. FARMERS OF IOWA (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://practicalfarmers.org/2018/11/who-owns-the-farmland/ [https://perma.cc/K32A-VTAW] (quoting
Neil Hamilton, Adams County Needs Young Farmers, in THE FUTURE OF FAMILY FARMS: PRACTICAL
FARMERS’ LEGACY LETTER PROJECT 82 (2016)).
26
Blumm & Tebeau, supra note 15, at 160.
27
Id. at 157, 173–74.
28
467 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1984).
29
HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-83(a).
30
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
31
1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 488 § 1(a).
32
Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellees at 5, Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (No. 83-141).
33
Land Reform Act of 1967, S.B. 1128 § 17 at 496.
34
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 516-83(a)(5), (a)(8).
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ownership concentration and inflation of real estate market prices,35 which
was a menace to public tranquility and welfare.36 While the Act was not
aimed at solving the “landless” status of many Native Hawaiians, it was
expected to ameliorate it after many decades of unfulfilled promises. Before
passing the Land Reform Act, the Native Hawaiians in their amicus brief
gave the following data:
[T]he state government owns a little under 39% of the total land area in the
state, the federal government owns a little less than 10%, and only 72 private
landowners, owning tracts of 1,000 acres or more, own 47%. This leaves less
than 5% of the land in Hawaii available for a population of approximately one
million. . . . The 18 largest landholders, with tracts of 21,000 acres or more, own
more than 40% of the state’s land area.37

The Bishop Estate, whose trustees challenged the constitutionality of
the Act leading to the famous Supreme Court case, owned 9% of all the land
of the state.38 The Pacific Legal Foundation, in its amicus brief supporting
the landowners, attacked the Land Reform Act because its justification of
too much land in too few hands was not unique to Hawaii, but common in
this country.39 In fact, the Foundation gave data from 1978 about the pattern
of landownership in the continental United States, stating that “[l]ess than
0.5 percent of the largest owners hold 40 percent of the land, while 78 percent
of the smallest owners hold about 3 percent of the land.”40 The Supreme
Court considered the Act a rational way to deal with a problem—land
oligopoly—affecting public interest.41
Part of the preference for ownership over tenancy has to do with
inequality. Concentration of control over natural resources can increase the
cost of those resources not only for other users, but also for end consumers.42
35

The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, on the contrary, felt that the fee simple ownership of lands by
individual lessees, as the Land Reform Act authorized, would cause the inflation in price of the land due
to the investment any one lessee would have in their land. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs in Support of Appellees at 28, Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (No. 83-141).
36
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232.
37
Brief of Amici Curiae The Hou Hawaiians & Maui Loa, Chief of the Hou Hawaiians at 32–33,
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (No. 83-141).
38
Id. at 33.
39
Brief of Amicus Curiae Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellees at 10, Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (No. 83-141).
40
Id. (quoting JAMES A. LEWIS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. INFO. BULL. NO. 435,
LANDOWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1978 ii (1980)), https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/
CAT87210033/PDF [https://perma.cc/8WND-Q5PV]).
41
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42.
42
SB 20-048 WORK GRP., REPORT OF THE WORK GROUP TO EXPLORE WAYS TO STRENGTHEN
CURRENT WATER ANTI-SPECULATION LAW § 4.b, at 34 (2021), https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1e3AgL3Ycvey3_qiObUWLX8r2RSakmhRk/view [https://perma.cc/B6NE-8TTM].
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The effect of concentration in inequality is perfectly captured by
groundwater overexploitation in some areas in Arizona.
Groundwater extraction is not subject to regulation everywhere. This is
the case in rural Arizona. In Sulphur Springs Valley, residential wells ran
dry while large farms kept flourishing.43 The residential wells impacted were
in low-income populations who often live in mobile homes. The area relies
on groundwater aquifers, and the aquifer water table kept getting lower and
lower as water pumping increased. Users pumped beyond what is considered
the safe yield, or the amount that allows the aquifer to recharge.44 The only
method for users to keep using water is to drill more, deeper wells.
Drilling a deeper well can cost between $15,000 and $30,000, as much
as half of the value of many homes in Sulfur Springs Valley.45 So while farms
continued to irrigate, residential owners had sand in their faucets and could
not take regular showers. Some of the farms were long-standing family farms
whose owners had opposed groundwater regulation. But recently, the lack of
regulation has attracted large, corporate farms, including Middle Eastern
farmers who, after running out of water in their places of origin, have adapted
easily to Arizona, where they grow alfalfa to export to Saudi Arabia.46 For
example, the Saudi Almarai Corporation bought 10,000 acres in the town of
Vicksburg, near Sulphur Springs Valley, and Al Dahra, from the United Arab
Emirates, bought several thousand-acre farms near Arizona’s border with
California.47
Before these large corporations arrived, farmers were mining
groundwater in steadily increasing amounts. But it has been the exponential
growth of this practice that has made the negative long-term consequences
obvious. Furthermore, these affluent corporate farms could drill deeper
wells, which are cost prohibitive for small farmers, and plant nut trees, which
demand constant irrigation. One farming conglomerate drilled or bought 293
wells, some pumping more than 2,000 gallons per minute.48

43
The New York Times recounted the story of the Paups, who moved to a mobile home in the area,
investing all their savings, only to run out of water one year later. They were then forced to find a new
place of abode after months and months of rationing water by not showering and not flushing toilets,
among other things. Noah Gallagher Shannon, The Water Wars of Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/magazine/the-water-wars-of-arizona.html
[https://perma.cc/E7NL-9V9D].
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.; Saudi Hay Farm in Arizona Tests State’s Supply of Groundwater, NPR (Nov. 2, 2015,
5:07 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/11/02/453885642/saudi-hay-farm-in-arizona-testsstates-supply-of-groundwater?t=1654614388663 [https://perma.cc/22BW-EQMB].
47
Shannon, supra note 43.
48
Id. In contrast, the above-mentioned Paups needed half a day to eke out five gallons. Id.
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Even with this situation where both the social—the lack of available
supply for residents—and environmental impacts called for a regulatory
solution limiting the use of groundwater, the Arizona legislature did not pass
a bill. It is important to note that limiting either water or land concentration
here could have effects on the use of the other resource, ensuring a more
equal distribution as this case suggests.
Two additional examples further illustrate the community drawbacks of
resource ownership concentration: the 2016 Scottish land reform and
Colorado’s path to curb water speculation. Scotland recently reformed its
property laws by passing the Land Reform Act of 2016.49 Both the reforms
and the preparatory works leading to them illuminate the discussion of the
effects of concentration. Community Land Scotland, a group of community
landowners, facilitated an academic and policy discussion about the
problems landownership in Scotland was facing.50 Mike Danson, an
economics professor at Heriot-Watt University, said that “[w]hen there are
monopoly powers over the land and its resources, the local community and
natural environment are threatened with negative externalities, capacity to
flourish is restricted and enforced outward migration is encouraged.”51
Additionally, “[w]hen private property rights are permitted to dominate
wider social and environmental needs, sustainability and inclusion, broadly
defined, are constrained.”52
Two issues were of concern in the enactment of the Scottish Land
Reform Act. First was the potential investment by foreign corporations and
the lack of traceability and accountability to the community for those
actors.53 Much of the foreign-owned property in Scotland was owned by
companies located in tax havens.54 To solve this issue, the Land Reform

49
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, (ASP 18), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2016/18/
contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/3EY7-9FUF].
50
MIKE DANSON, SCOPING THE CLASSIC EFFECTS OF MONOPOLIES WITHIN CONCENTRATED
PATTERNS OF RURAL LAND OWNERSHIP 1 (2020), https://www.communitylandscotland.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Scoping-the-classic-effects-of-monopolies-within-patterns-of-rural-landownership-a-discussion-paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CV-L5DD].
51
Id. at 38.
52
Id.
53
LAND REFORM REV. GRP., THE LAND OF SCOTLAND AND THE COMMON GOOD § 5, at 35 (2014),
https://www.gov.scot/binaries/content/documents/govscot/publications/progress-report/2014/05/landreform-review-group-final-report-land-scotland-common-good/documents/00451087-pdf/00451087pdf/govscot%3Adocument/00451087.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MZ8-9R9A].
54
Joe Lo, Revealed: The Billions in Scots Property Owned by Offshore Accounts, NATIONAL
(June 21, 2020), https://www.thenational.scot/news/18531316.revealed-billions-scots-property-ownedoffshore-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/J65G-JY56].
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Review Group proposed not to allow entities without a European domicile
to own land in Scotland.55
Second, there were concerns about ownership concentration,
particularly in rural property. At the time of the report that spurred the Land
Reform Act, 432 private landowners owned half of the private land in rural
Scotland—that is, half of this key resource was owned by 0.008% of the
population.56 The report raised questions about the significance of this
measure of inequality in a democracy. In fact, Scotland is sometimes
described as having the most concentrated pattern of ownership in the
world.57 This concentration is in part tied to being the last country to abolish
feudal tenure with the Abolition of Feudal Tenure Act of 2000.58
Concentration was reduced by purchases by public entities and by the growth
of owner-occupied farms.59 But the subsequent trend seemed to be one of
reconcentration. Accordingly, the review group, arguing that “[l]and is a
finite, national resource,” proposed to limit the amount of land someone
could own.60
The review group proposed a limit because ownership is the key
determinant of how land is used.61 The concentration of private ownership in
rural property, as the Scotland case shows, can often stifle entrepreneurial
ambition, local aspirations, and the ability to address an identified
community need. The concentrated ownership of private land in rural
communities places considerable power in the hands of relatively few
individuals, which can in turn have a huge impact on the lives of local
people62 and jars with the idea of a modern democracy. Property law shapes
our social relationships. In a democracy, where we all ought to be free and
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equal, if property law favors or allows for concentration of ownership,
freedom and equality are eroded.63
Furthermore, the study authorized by the land commission states that
while private capital may be a driver of rural development, private capital
does not necessarily need to be coupled with large landholdings.64
Alternative sources of private capital could invest in rural areas without
being the landowners. Relatedly, the evidence of huge economies of scale in
agriculture is weak, and where such evidence exists, these economies of
scale benefit landowners more than the population at large.65 In the Scottish
report, economies of scale are questioned because there is no evidence that
smaller holdings could not accomplish similar results and because the
benefits may not be attributable to size but to the policies and the fiscal
environment giving preferential treatment to larger holdings at the time.66 In
addition, the report points out that large landholdings are neither sufficient
nor necessary to environmental protection.67 Large landholdings create
imbalances of power between the landlord and the locals, and the latter may
be reluctant to oppose the large landowner.68
However, despite the critiques to landownership concentration, there
have not been many reforms that tackle the problems derived from it in
Scotland. The most recent reforms, beyond the right to roam,69 have tackled
concentration indirectly by regulating and expanding the right of
communities to buy private land,70 even for environmental sustainability
reasons.71 Thus, Scotland has tackled the problem of ownership
concentration indirectly, empowering local communities to acquire land
from those large landholdings. But the land reform in Scotland has been a
long process, and perhaps it is not yet completed.
The problem of ownership concentration is not exclusive to land. Water
is currently experiencing such an issue. It is often said that “water is the new
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oil.”72 This statement, beyond conjuring the image of water wars starting as
oil conflicts did, captures the idea that with the rise of climate change, water
is a sound financial investment.
What for many years has been a prediction is now a reality.73 Water
Asset Management, an investment management firm based in New York
City, is the main water rights holder in many areas in Colorado.74 It has leased
back those lands to the same farmers who were cultivating them before.75
The role of financial entities such as Water Asset Management is making
farming communities and the State of Colorado queasy, illustrating both the
effects of such outside investment on the communities and the effects on
local and state governments.76 Small farmers fear the competition of large
agricultural companies, and communities fear that outsiders will sell their
water rights to faraway cities and compromise the community’s future
economic development; little can happen without water.77
Furthermore, when water is sold outside the community, economic
activity decreases because farmers are not producing.78 But not only farmers
are affected; from migrant workers to general stores providing supplies, all
suffer the slowdown.79 Finally, local governments can be dwarfed by the
power of those extremely large owners. Colorado’s anti-speculation law
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work group acknowledged that concentration of water rights in one person
could lead to changes in irrigation organizations’ bylaws favoring the
powerful owner.80 Water Asset Management is not the exception. Beyond
Colorado, Greenstone—a subsidiary of the financial conglomerate
MassMutual—quietly bought the rights to most of Colorado River’s water
in the town of Cibola, Arizona, bordering California.81
In sum, as the examples of Hawaii, Arizona, Scotland, and Colorado
have shown, ownership concentration has effects beyond the users of the
resource. Small owners may be forced to sell to large, powerful owners
because they may not be able to compete. New small owners will have a hard
time entering the market. While this may be considered no differently than
any other market effect, it has an impact on the communities that were
dependent on those small owners conducting business there. Communities
fear that powerful, often absentee, owners of resources will disregard the
development of the community. As a result, the community will no longer
be able to decide its fate because the control of resources will be elsewhere.
Furthermore, concentration can make local communities less likely to stand
up to the powerful actor and the rules may be tipped in the powerful actor’s
favor.
In this Part, the examples of ownership concentration in land in Hawaii
and Scotland, and in water in Colorado and Arizona, have illustrated the
problems with said concentration. The next Part will explore different cases
in which deconcentrating measures were adopted to deal with some or all of
the problems arising from ownership concentration, including access to
ownership by all, effects on small holders, effects on the community at large,
and the counterpower to state power.
II. LESSONS FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
There are different ways to deal with concentration in any market. The
most common way is to resort to antitrust enforcement and penalize market
forces that have led to harmful concentration. Or one could prevent mergers
that could result in too much concentration in a market and harm the end
consumer.82 Alternatively, and this is the focus of this Essay, we could also
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amend the property system behind that market to prevent concentration
from emerging.
In natural resources, two groups of measures have emerged: (1) limiting
how much of a resource one can hold and (2) requiring certain characteristics
of the property owners. The first implies not allowing any one owner to
control more than a certain amount of a single resource. Minerals on federal
lands, the homestead, or water rights use these types of measures. The latter
approach—limiting who can be a rights holder—uses characteristics of the
owner as a proxy of potential power in the market. For example, if we require
the property owner to be an individual or a family, we expect their wealth
not to allow them to accumulate as much property as a corporation would;
but of course, there are still some large family-run corporations. Farmland
statutes in the Midwest and fisheries regulations in Alaska offer examples of
this second type of measure.
All of the measures reviewed below do not aim only at maximizing
productivity through the property rights structure, although that may be part
of the calculation. They aim to mitigate the effects of concentration on the
broader community,83 both today and in terms of future development. This
move is similar to current trends in antitrust theory. While the standard of
antitrust has been laser-focused on consumer welfare—analyzing how
market structure affects the price end consumers will face—recently the New
Brandeis School of Antitrust has approached the inquiry more holistically,
looking at the overall impact of companies and market structure on society.84
For the measures analyzed in fisheries, farmland, and water, the question is
not whether the large holding is productively efficient as a unit, but what
effects such a holding has on ownership access, the community, and
the regulator.
In this vein, when analyzing the different contexts below, it is important
to differentiate scale and power, because we often use concentration to refer
to both. Scale itself may provide some social benefits, but concentration of
social and economic power seldom does. Owning a large swath of land in an
area may not go hand in hand with concentration of power, but it often does.85
Most of the measures may affect scale through rules limiting how much of a
resource a single owner can hold to ensure that while efficiency may suffer
a hit, other social values and social welfare are advanced. Others adopt
83
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standards to police the conduct of owners who abuse their power without
automatically assuming scale is a synonym of power. This is the case with
the proposed reform of Colorado’s water regime that prohibits speculative
aims by large water rights holders.
Measures limiting quantity and the subjects that can be rights holders
are not an automatic recipe for success, as the Iowa anti-corporate farmland
regulations illustrate, but often move the needle in the right direction. The
following cases on homesteads, minerals, fisheries, farmland, and water
rights aim to demonstrate how jurisdictions have limited or are planning to
limit the amount of a resource someone can own and who that someone
can be.
A. Homesteading
The United States’ Homestead Acts86 aimed to ensure the settlement of
the West and provide revenue for the federal government by selling federal
land. Each applicant received 160 acres. The goal was to give the
homesteader the amount of land necessary to have his own independent farm.
It would not be a farm like the vast Southern ones that depended on many
hired or enslaved hands, but a self-sufficient family farm. To an extent, 160
was a good acreage for a family farm. If we were to focus on pure agricultural
output, larger farming operations were, even then, likely to be more
profitable. The current struggle of family farms against agribusinesses
clearly shows that.87
Those 160 acres were also an affordable number. Prior to the
Homesteading Act of 1862, the federal government divided the territory into

86
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six-mile squares, called townships.88 A township was divided into thirty-six
sections, each measuring 640 acres. Individuals could only buy a full section
of land at $1 per acre.89 This was a huge investment for those who wanted to
move west, and coupled with the hard—if not impossible when done alone—
work to prepare those lands for agriculture, it discouraged many. Later, the
section was divided, and the unit of acquisition was 320 acres, but that was
still not enough to entice people to move west. Some parties were happy with
this reluctance to move, such as owners of factories in the Northeast who
feared a westward expansion would leave them without workers, or
proslavery Southerners who thought these new landowning farmers may be
against slavery.90
To acquire title, homesteaders had to file an application, improve the
land, and file for the deed. The General Land Office wanted the homestead
to be the primary residence of the applicant for at least five years and wanted
the applicant to improve the homestead during that time.91 Given the
moderate price of the land, it seems safe to assume the federal government
did not want this to be a giveaway to large agricultural productions, although
they awarded full sections to railroads to help the expansion—requiring
residence achieved that result.
However, as settlers moved to drier parts of the West and the purposes
of the homestead changed,92 so too did the allotments’ sizes. This suggests
that while efficiency was not a main component, the goal was to balance the
viability of the operations with ensuring the settlement of the West and the
prevention of windfalls to overly powerful actors. The Kinkaid Act of 1904
granted up to 640 acres per application in the Nebraska Sandhills for just a
modest filing fee.93 The Act required five years of residence before the Three
Year Homestead Act reduced that requirement to three years.94 The period
was shortened to attract more settlers. The land covered was nonirrigable
land and, as such, more land was necessary to make an exploit viable.
Similarly, the Desert Land Entry Act allocated a whole section only if the
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settler irrigated the land.95 Not motivated by the terrain but by the needs of a
particular economic activity to be developed, the 160 acreage was expanded
for grazing: the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 provided for grants
up to 640 acres for cattle ranching, but the settler would not get the mineral
estate.96 Other acts that included limits on acreage when settling on federal
land were the Timber Culture Act, which sought to promote tree planting
under the theory that it promoted precipitation by allowing settlers to claim
160 acres if forty acres were planted, and the Timber and Stone Act, which
authorized settlers and miners to buy up to 160 acres of land with potential
timber and mineral resources for $2.50 per acre.97
The limits on acreage and the residency requirements of the
Homesteading Acts illustrate the antimonopoly principle of U.S. public land
policy. This principle embodies the idea of granting access to land to many
and ensuring powerful interests do not take control.98
B. Minerals on Federal Lands
Federal lands abound. They represent 28% of the land in the United
States.99 Private parties hold oil and gas, mineral, and coal leases on these
lands. In fact, the Bureau of Land Management alone administers 700
million acres of subsurface mineral estate.100
A single company cannot hold all the rights to this federal mineral
estate. Historically, according to the Mineral Leasing Act, each person or
company could not get more than three oil and gas leases in a state or more
than one in a geological structure.101 But in 1926 the rule was further refined,
adding acreage limitations. It limited each individual rights holder to 7,560
acres in each state and 2,560 acres in a structure.102 These restrictions were
not foolproof. Companies managed to enter into operating agreements with
permittees to control and produce on far more acres than the limitations
allowed them to without a lease assignment.103 In 1938, the Department of
Interior, aware of that practice, established that the operating agreements
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counted towards the acreage limitation.104 In 1946, however, the Mineral
Leasing Act was amended to expand the acreage limitation per state to
15,360 acres and abolish the limitations within a single formation in order to
allow for larger scale operations.105
Today, there are still limitations. No person or corporation shall hold or
control oil and gas leases on more than 246,080 acres in one state, except in
Alaska.106 In Alaska, the limitation is 300,000 acres in the Northern Leasing
District and 300,000 acres in the Southern Leasing District.107 The definition
of control is broad to ensure that parties cannot work around these
limitations—for example, a stockholder of a corporation cannot hold a lease
in a given state other than Alaska if that corporation has leased 246,080 acres
in that state.108 Furthermore, there is a limit on foreign individuals or
companies leasing energy resources.109
The same is true for coal leases:
No person, association, or corporation, or any subsidiary, affiliate, or persons
controlled by or under common control with such person, association, or
corporation shall take, hold, own or control at one time, whether acquired
directly from the Secretary under this chapter or otherwise, coal leases or
permits on an aggregate of more than 75,000 acres in any one State and in no
case greater than an aggregate of 150,000 acres in the United States. 110

The regime for coal greatly contrasts with the regime for nonenergy
minerals, which has been criticized for a long time for being a handout to
powerful mining companies.111
The acreage limitations are not just based on any efficiency calculation.
In fact, the regulations clarify that they do not apply to communalization
situations, in which operators cannot independently develop separate wells
due to well-spacing programs so they cooperatively develop such tracts, or
situations in which the parties need to pool resources to build some
infrastructure in common.112 The limits on leasing minerals and energy
resources in federal lands are aimed at ensuring distribution of those
104
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resources to avoid concentration of power that could threaten governmental
control and energy security.
C. Fisheries
The depletion of ocean fisheries makes our oceans the best example of
the tragedy of the commons.113 The depletion of stocks and the
overcapitalization in the industry required a solution, but data was imprecise
and jurisdiction fragmented, as the U.S. Comptroller General determined in
1976.114 One widely adopted solution to this common-pool problem is
limiting entry by establishing a cap and assigning fishing quotas. In Alaska,
the process to establish fishing quotas for halibut and sablefish took years to
develop. The process started in roughly 1976 with the passage of what is now
known as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery and Conservation Management
Act, and it concluded in 1995 when an individual fishing quota system (IFQ)
was implemented after years of moratoriums on new licenses.115
The long discussion on limited entry drove speculators into the market.
In addition, during this period, the number of vessels, the average size of
vessels, and the technological capacity to capture fish grew. The race for
halibut and sablefish intensified, and the fishing seasons substantively
shortened. A normal halibut season had previously been 120 days, but
overexploitation and the race to fish reduced the season to twenty-four hours.
This short length also implied that the working conditions of fishermen were
rougher, and safety was often disregarded.116
Fishermen in Oregon, Washington, and Alaska had interest in those
fisheries. There was tension between longtime fishermen and new fishermen,
aggravated by the fact that longtime fishermen were mostly Seattle-based,
while the new entrants were from Alaska. The latter feared that most of the
fish would go to Seattle-based businesses, which had more capacity.117
While there was no shortage of controversy, the dire situation finally
prompted a consensus in the 1990s that IFQs were the solution. The IFQ
system for halibut and sablefish fisheries in Alaska is still one of the most
113
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ambitious undertaken in the United States.118 Under the initial IFQ system,
each fisherman got a quota that they could use during the open season (March
15 to November 15).119 This eliminates the premium placed on speed that is
typical of a rule-of-capture system such as IFQs.120 The quotas were specific
to certain regulatory areas within the Gulf of Alaska and the Bering Sea to
avoid localized depletion effects.121 The initial allocation gave quotas to
fishermen currently engaged in the business, either vessel owners or
leaseholders. However, crew members got priority if the shares were
transferred. The percentage allocated to each person, which was based on
their historical capture even if they did not fish every year, was applied to
the annual catch to figure out the IFQs assigned on a particular season.122
The quotas were also specific to different vessel categories. There were
two main types of fixed-gear vessels that seek sablefish and halibut: newer,
longer fleet vessels, and smaller catcher vessels which had been catching
these species in the area for a long time and took their catch to shore
processors.123 The quotas were not only defined per type of vessel, but also
per vessel size within the category.124 The idea behind this complex system
of nonfungible quotas was to ensure that quotas were not accumulated by
large owners. If large owners could acquire quotas freely, there would be a
full-scale reorganization of the industry, crowding out smaller vessels that
operated out of smaller communities.125 In addition, the North Pacific Fishery
Management Council established a community development program for
certain disadvantaged western Alaska Native communities. In the Bering Sea
and Aleutians area, 20% of the sablefish quota was assigned to these
communities.126 Under the program, 5,626 vessel owners, mostly based in
118
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Alaska, received quotas.127 This allocation of quotas protecting small
businesses and native communities shows that the concern of the IFQ
program was not just ensuring the sustainability of the fisheries, but also the
economic and social sustainability of the communities.
In addition to the types of quotas created, there were limits on
transferability. Initially, the Council discussed totally prohibiting transfers
of quotas, to avoid both consolidation and windfall profits from the transfers,
because it was believed that anyone should be allowed to profit from
governmentally created quotas on a resource.128 In the end, the Council
decided to not go that far and just set limits on the amount of leasing and
selling when the quotas were established. For the first three years, only 10%
of the quota could be leased. Catcher boat shares could be sold but only to a
crew member. Companies could buy shares only if they had shares assigned
to them in the initial allocation. New entrants had to be individuals, already
engaged in the trade, and not corporations.
Furthermore, even if sales and leases were allowed, nobody could
control more than 1% of the sablefish shares and no more than 0.5% of the
halibut tonnage available. There were also limits on the amount of quota that
could be used on a single vessel. Initially, quotas had to be traded among
vessels of the same size, but later the Council allowed the sale of quotas from
larger vessels to smaller ones. The quotas were only assigned and assignable
to U.S. citizens and U.S. companies.129
This system cost about $2.7 million a year to enforce.130 Quotas were
expected to bring higher quality fish and provide annual benefits from $30
to $67 million. But most important for our analysis is the fact that without
the vessel restrictions that prevented the redistribution of catch to the lower
cost vessels, estimated benefits were $11–$14 million higher.131 Yet the
Council decided to forgo those in favor of a wider distribution of those lower
benefits thanks to the types of quotas and the limits on their transferability.
Here, property rights were crafted in a way that increased efficiency but
sacrificed their full potential to serve other purposes.132
The Council also dealt with an issue that often occurs when there is
concentration of ownership: absentee owners. One practice observed has
been the owner of vessels hiring skippers to fish his or her fishing quotas.133
127
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This is conceivably similar to a lease. This practice, however, runs afoul of
the initial idea the Council had when establishing the system of having an
owner-operated fleet. Some cases suggested, though, that not all nonfishing
owners were absentee ones and that some owners were really involved in the
management of the vessel. And cases have existed in which partnerships had
been established. Accordingly, in the late 1990s, the Council responded by
grandfathering all skipper-hiring arrangements into true partnerships,
sometimes with a cap on the percentage the nonfishing owner
could control.134
In sum, fishing quotas were established to solve a rampant
environmental problem and the depletion of ocean fisheries, but the
established regime did not aim to maximize efficiency at any cost; instead,
the regime wanted to ensure the viability of small businesses and the future
of workers and communities that depended on them.
D. Farmland
Since 1975, Iowa farming legislation has been branded “anticorporate.”135 It is also relevant to note that as of 2014 Iowa ranked second,
following Illinois, in total agricultural rent received at $3.7 billion.136
Initially, the Iowa legislature passed legislation prohibiting the vertical
integration of feedlots and meatpackers. While those provisions were
declared unconstitutional,137 another one passed: a moratorium preventing
corporations from acquiring new agricultural land.138 This moratorium led
the way for the current regulation that still restricts corporate ownership over
Iowa farmland. While there are convoluted exceptions, the general idea is
that corporate entities (LLCs, corporations, or trusts) cannot lease or own
agricultural land. This restriction does not apply to family-owned entities.
Family-owned corporate entities must be established for agricultural
purposes, owned majorly by people related to each other (as spouses, parents,
grandparents, or lineal descendants of grandparents or their spouses), owned
134
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by people or family trusts, and able to show that 60% of their gross income
over the past three years came from farming.139 This definition has a
loophole: it allows a family-owned entity to own land and rent it out,
provided the tenant uses it for agricultural purposes.
There is a second exception: some authorized entities are allowed to
acquire farmland in Iowa. These authorized entities cannot own more than
1,500 acres and must have been formed for agricultural purposes, cannot
have more than twenty-five owners, and must benefit natural people—that
is, living human beings—or nonprofits.140 Iowa farmland thus presents both
a limit on quantity and on who can own the resource.141 The limits on
corporate ownership are sometimes constraining for those who want to farm
in cooperative or other innovative forms of ownership.
These regulations seem to paint an auspicious picture of Iowa’s
farmland ownership if one believes concentration should be prevented—
assuming family corporations are less likely to amass mammoth holdings—
and if a certain economic model of small farming operations is coveted.
However, given the loopholes, family-owned does not necessarily mean
family-farmed. More than half of the agricultural land in Iowa is owned by
someone who does not currently farm; 34% of this land farmed by
nonowners is owned by people with no farming experience, and the rest by
retired farmers.142 The trend toward cash leases instead of crop-share
agreements is partially explained by the fact that tenants now have
multiple landowners.143
This trend suggests that while ownership may not be concentrated,
agricultural production is more concentrated. Farmland in Iowa is usually
intended to be passed from generation to generation, rather than sold on the
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market.144 This practice is not necessarily positive, as the lack of supply
creates a tight market. Ownership is scattered in part because parcels may be
divided among heirs.145 This tight market is also confirmed by the fact that
landlords who are retired farmers are, on average, renting out larger
parcels.146 Most farmland is owned by people sixty-five years old or older.147
Young farmers have a hard time accessing landownership and instead rent,
which prevents them from acting with regard to the long-term effects and
investment on such land.148
In sum, Iowa farmland anti-corporate regulations show that while the
aim of the regime may be to protect small family farms and farmers,
regulatory loopholes and agricultural production economies of scale make
the achievement of the regime’s goals less likely.
E. Water Rights
“Prior appropriation” is a regime that allocates water in the American
West.149 Like regimes in other dry jurisdictions, water is not envisioned as a
profit-making asset since the water remains free.150 The anti-speculation
doctrine explains that idea.151 Based on that doctrine, those who hold water
rights must use them. They cannot sit on their water rights, waiting to sell
them whenever supply is low and the price high. Water must be put to
production. If water rights are not used, they can be forfeited.152 This doctrine
has worked well for centuries, but today is falling short at preventing profitmaking ventures.
Water Asset Management, a New York-based investment management
firm, has bought the majority of the rights to many Colorado mutuals, such
as the Grand Valley Water Users Association.153 Water Asset Management
144
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is complying with the letter of the law, but perhaps not its spirit. In Colorado,
it bought water rights and leased them and the land back to the previous
owners, so water rights are used.154 What remains an enigma is exactly what
these financial investors are really pursuing.
Some claim they want to play arbitrage.155 The State of Colorado has
water rights buyback programs to ensure the state can comply with the
obligations of the soon-to-expire Colorado River Compact.156 With climate
change dwindling supplies and increasing demand, the state can only comply
if it pays farmers not to irrigate. If they need water from certain areas or a
certain volume, their counterpart will have to be Water Asset Management.157
Others believe Water Asset Management is waiting to sell the water,
not to the state, but to urban areas in the market once a drought crisis strikes
or regular scarcity is insurmountable.158 These hypotheses ring true given the
past conduct of the company. Water Asset Management’s CEO has often
offered versions of the adage “water is the new oil,” such as “Investing in
the water industry is one of the great opportunities for the coming
decades . . . . Water is the scarce resource that will define the 21st century,
much like plentiful oil defined the last century.”159 The State of Colorado has
been studying how to amend its water laws to ensure that this type of
concentration is avoided.160
The attitude of some farmers towards these new entrants in the water
market could be perceived as another instance of protectionism. They not
only dislike Water Asset Management, but they purportedly also dislike
newcomers investing in agricultural land and managing it differently.161 This
is the critique of Eli Feldman, the president of Conscience Bay, a real estate
investment firm based in Boulder. Conscience Bay owns a 3,400-acre ranch,
Harts Basin Ranch, in Colorado’s Delta County.162 With this ranch,
shareholders. Irrigation in Colorado, COLO. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://coloradoencyclopedia.org/article/
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Conscience Bay owns the highest priority water right, meaning its water right
is the oldest—it dates from 1881—and gives it the right to use water from
Surface Creek in Grand Mesa first.163 Neighboring farmers and water
managers look at Conscience Bay with suspicion. But Conscience Bay
denies that its goal is to engage in water speculation. Instead, the company
claims it is in the ranching business, there to raise cattle differently: it
produces “organic beef using regenerative techniques that operators say are
better for [the] soil.”164
It is hard to regulate water investment and craft limits on waterhoarding practices that distinguish between those engaging in speculative
practices—such as, purportedly, Water Asset Management—and those who
are large investors, but presumably do not want to engage in speculation, as
Conscience Bay claims.165 Distinguishing between the two assumes that size
alone is not the problem; instead, the aims of the different actors when
coupled with size are the problem.
Colorado’s water landscape shows the potential difference between
scale and power, and between nonspeculative and speculative investment. In
2020, the Colorado legislature passed Senate Bill 20-048 to commission a
“Study Strengthening Water Anti-speculation Law.”166 The bill created an
anti-speculation law work group, which published its final report in August
2021.167 The report prompted the Colorado legislature to act, and in January
2022, Senate Bill 22-029 was introduced to curb speculation.168
As stated above, farmers may disapprove when entities such as either
Water Asset Management or Conscience Bay invest in water rights.169 Senate
Bill 22-029 tries to walk that line with a rebuttable presumption. The bill
prohibits water speculation, which it understands as purchasing agricultural
water rights with the intent—at the time of the purchase—to profit from an
increase in water’s price in a subsequent transaction, or to profit by receiving
payment from a third party, including the government, for not using that
water.170 The bill then allows each mutual water district to decide which
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percentage of water rights someone must hold to trigger the presumption that
the holder is engaging in water speculation.171
Concentration of ownership of said rights is the rough proxy for
speculation. If the state engineer finds the purchaser engaged in water
speculation, the purchaser may receive a fine up to $10,000 and stricter
controls over his future transactions.172 Furthermore, to prevent potential
spiteful claims, the state engineer may refer a frivolous or harassing
complaint to the state attorney general, who then may bring a civil action
against the complainant.173
The work group that arose out of Senate Bill 20-048 proposed other
solutions, such as taxing all transactions, intensifying the review of any
transaction, or limiting the participation of out-of-state entities.174 But those
measures could have affected virtually every transfer, discouraging
desirable, nonspeculative transfers that could be a move in the right
direction. Interestingly enough, the work group reviewed the Federal Bureau
of Reclamation’s approach to speculation, emphasizing its acreage
limitation, but the group did not put forward any proposal along these lines.175
The Colorado case shows the embedded idea that water should not be an
investment asset, and that excessive profit from a resource can be negative
for the community and challenge established state rules.
While Colorado is today’s battleground, aggressive water speculation
and concentration is not just a problem in Colorado. Claims of water
investment by financial companies aiming to speculate and rip off profits
plague the West, where water has always been scarce and is getting scarcer
as demand goes up and supplies dwindle due to climate change.176 Water
Asset Management itself, via Water and Land, LLC, formed in the State of
Delaware, invested in the Humboldt River Basin in Nevada, acquiring
Winnemucca Farm and its 36,261 acre-feet of water rights.177 It went on to
file for a water right permit to divert 300,000 acre-feet, the same amount of
171
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water that the State of Nevada is entitled to.178 Water Asset Management has
also invested in Arizona.179 But it is not the only one; Greenstone has also
bought 8,863 acres of farmland and associated senior water rights, the most
valuable on the lower Colorado river.180
Beyond the United States’ borders, Australia’s water market is the best
example of the perils of concentration in water rights. It justifies Colorado
taking action to prevent negative effects of large water investments.
Australia’s cap-and-trade water-market reforms after its Millennium
Drought were the poster child for those who advocated for water markets as
the tool to help the dry western United States avoid crises.181 While the
amendments to their water regulations were promising, the results recently
made public do not seem to fulfill that promise. Arbitrage was rampant. The
Australian government, having approved water-intensive mining projects
that drastically reduced the country’s supply, was forced to buy $80 million
in water from a private company based in the Cayman Islands.182 Some rural
areas still do not have enough water.183
Homesteads, minerals and fossil fuels on federal lands, fisheries,
farmland in the Midwest, and water rights in Colorado and beyond, show
that our natural resource policies have not let the market decide how large
its actors could be. Instead, there have been regulations defining rights over
those resources that limited the accumulation of those resources in a single
owner and who that owner could be. Many of these regulations have defined
scale or concentration as a proxy for power. Scale is naturally benign and
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may bring benefits in the form of economies of scale. But the benefits of
scale do not necessarily require single ownership. Having fewer owners
certainly reduces the number of parties that need to agree, but many believe
property law is more than just a coordination device and that it should not
facilitate the accumulation of resources.184
Often, scale is a synonym for concentration, that is, many resources in
a particular geographic market held in a few hands. Concentration can be a
problem because while fewer owners imply lower transaction costs, access
to property by smaller actors may be impeded by those large landowners who
can outbid them or exercise soft power.185 In addition, larger actors may not
bring as many community benefits as smaller ones.
The problem intensifies when scale and concentration translate into
power, as it often does. When there is one or few individuals controlling land
or another scarce resource in a particular area, those individuals are in a
position of power vis-à-vis smaller market players, other community
members, and often governmental agencies. This power is perceived as even
more dangerous when the powerful actor is an outsider. If the actor is foreign,
there are security concerns regarding the control over natural resources. But
even within a country, communities feel that entities from other jurisdictions
care less about the effects their actions have on the territory.
As the different cases in fisheries, water, or agricultural land have
shown, scale, concentration, and control are context dependent. As a result,
there is no single recipe to ensure a market where rights over resources are
evenly distributed. However, there are variables that matter when
considering the feasibility of deconcentrating measures, both quantitative—
limits on how many rights someone can accumulate—and qualitative—who
can hold rights and how they can be traded—as the next Part will show.
III. FACTORS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
This Part aims to understand which natural resource deconcentrating
measures should be enacted to combat concentration. Some of the examples
of natural resource concentration mentioned, namely Scotland’s land reform
and Arizona’s groundwater investments, did not lead to aggressive
deconcentration measures. Others, such as the minerals and fisheries
reviewed in Part II, have resulted in deconcentration measures, from limits
184
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on total holding to trade restrictions or requirements regarding who can be a
rights holder. Building on those successful and unsuccessful cases, there are
several factors that matter when establishing deconcentration measures: the
existence of established rights, the geographical scope of the market and its
fit with existing regulatory bodies, the homogeneity of the users and uses,
and the presence of community externalities.
First, many of the reforms covered, like homesteading, were enacted
before many appropriations occurred. As such, there were fewer preexisting
interests that could block the reform. The same could be said about fisheries
in Alaska since those moved from an open access regime to the quota system.
However, in the fisheries’ cases, preexisting interests were far more
entrenched and passing a reform was complicated. Colorado’s water regime
is an interesting case because the reforms will change the current prior
appropriation regime, but the majority of current users will not be affected
because the reform targets only large, out-of-state actors who can be very
influential but may not carry election votes. Preexisting interests, the need to
grandfather those in, and transition costs can make the establishment of
deconcentration measures costlier.
The second variable is the geographical scope of the market and how
easy it is to define. Establishing how many resources in a single entity’s hand
are too many is easier to do if the area of analysis—the market—is somewhat
circumscribed. Defining when some agent has too much control over a single
fishery, or a mutual district, is easier than defining it for an overall land
system like in the case of Scotland. This analysis is somewhat like antitrust
law’s market definition step before assessing whether some company or
some merger yields too much power. But it is also different because in
antitrust, the definition has two sides: the product definition (which products
compete with each other) and the geographic one (where they sell the
product).186
As such, the antitrust analysis tends to focus on the output market for
those companies, while in land and natural resources the focus is on the
inputs, which may or may not translate into concentration in the output
market. The output of agricultural companies could be sold anywhere in the
United States or even abroad, but the effects of the input intake are local. As
stated in the Introduction, the deconcentrating measures are not aimed at
simply correcting a market failure and ensuring efficiency, but at ensuring
access to the resources for smaller users and, in turn, protecting the nearby
community. This approach connects with the new wave of antitrust thought
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that does not focus only on low prices for consumer welfare but takes a wider
view of social welfare and recognizes how giants may offer low prices to end
consumers but still have negative societal effects.
Relatedly, whether the scope overlaps with the jurisdiction of a certain
agency is a relevant issue, because otherwise a regulator may be ineffective.
In the fisheries example, the regulator mapped the scope of the fishery, even
accounting for fish being fugitive resources. In Colorado, all mutuals are
within the jurisdiction. This also implies that effects beyond the jurisdiction
or unit are not captured. If Water Asset Management buys plenty of rights in
two Colorado mutuals but the percentage of rights it owns in each is below
the threshold each mutual has established to trigger the anti-speculation
provisions, Water Asset Management will escape review.
The third variable is the relative level of users’ and uses’ homogeneity.
If every user of the resource is engaged in the same activity, it is easier to
calculate what amount of resources is reasonable to be viable in producing a
particular output than if users differ a lot in their output types and need
different amounts of input. This explains why establishing limits on the
number of quotas a fisherman can hold is easier than setting limits on the
amount of land an owner can hold in Scotland. Land has multiple uses; even
agricultural crops may need different scales, and it would be very hard to
define up-front how much land is too much. The same is true of water. This
may explain why Colorado’s bill did not include some of the more
interventionist measures advanced by its anti-speculation law work group.
The proposed measures—such as tying water to land or imposing time limits
on ownership turnover—would have targeted every single transaction, large
and small.187
Fourth, and relatedly, the presence of identifiable community
externalities may move regulators to introduce deconcentrating measures.
Ensuring the distribution of the resource among its direct users is certainly a
motivation of the deconcentrating measures, but in many cases, the
distribution also benefits other members of the community. The halibut
fisheries illustrate this point: the limit of the percentage of quotas held and
the preservation of small businesses were in part motivated by the intention
to ensure that economic activity did not dry up in small harbors.
CONCLUSION
Concentration in the ownership of any resource can have deleterious
effects; land is no exception. While scale may have benefits, if concentration
goes hand in hand with power, as it often does, it has negative effects.
187
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Concentration makes access to the resource difficult for smaller agents, and
it can create a counterpower to the local government when a large actor or
group of actors seize control of ownership and distribution of a resource.
Concentration also produces community externalities in situations where the
owner ignores the local community’s needs, jeopardizing the future of the
local community.
In most markets, antitrust laws control for concentration either before a
merger or when illegal conduct is suspected. In natural resources,
antimonopoly policies have been implemented for limiting property rights
by setting up a maximum amount of the resource someone can own or
limiting who the owner can be. From fisheries to homesteading, Iowa
farmland, and mineral rights, we have imposed limits on property rights over
certain resources. The deconcentration measures found in natural resources
do not only have efficiency in the particular market in mind, but look at the
impacts of concentration on the local community as a whole.
Whether the measures from fisheries in Alaska or water in Colorado
can be transplanted to land elsewhere will be context dependent, but those
cases where measures have been adopted present the following
characteristics: a defined, somewhat local, market; certain homogeneity of
uses and users; and identifiable community externalities. These
characteristics are neither necessary nor sufficient but may facilitate
legislators’ and regulators’ actions.
Comparing regulation of fisheries to potential responses to the
purported land grab by Google in the Bay Area illustrates these three
characteristics.188 Fishing quotas are only coveted by fishermen—and
perhaps environmentalists—while land is useful to many for very disparate
reasons. Fishing grounds are somewhat easier to delimit than the appropriate
land market to assess the level of concentration of ownership in the Bay
Area. Furthermore, the connection between small fishermen and their
community is more palpable and assessable than between different
landowners and plots of land in Mountain View, although the latter
connection is undeniable. The growth of Google and other tech giant
campuses has clearly gentrified the poorest neighborhoods in the area,
displacing longtime residents.189
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Given the wealth concentration in the United States and the increased
scarcity of many natural resources, adopting measures to check such
concentration in land and elsewhere could be advisable. Doing so would
honor the antimonopoly principle that pervaded the historical allocation of
rights over public lands and that is present in many other natural resources
regimes. This Essay aims to start this conversation.
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